Structural Change and Patterns of International Trade by Robert E. Baldwin
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND PATTERNS
OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Robert E. Baldwin
Working Paper No. 2058




The research reported here is part of the NBER's research program
in International Studies. Any opinions expressed are those of the
author and not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.NBER Working Paper #2058
October 1986
Structural Change and Patterns of International Trade
ABSTRACT
This paper focuses on economists' understanding of the basic
determinants of trade patterns and, in particular, on the manner
in which these underlying factors change over time and are
affected by various policies.A brief survey contrasts the
determinants of the structure of trade emphasized by the
Ricardian, Meckscher—Ohlin, and imperfect competition models and
discusses how well the predictions of these various theories are
supported by empirical evidence.The main conclusion of the
survey is that trade economists have been reasonably successful
in explaining the structure of trade at any point in time but
much less successful in understanding how the determinants of the
patterns of trade change over time.This inability to explain
how the basic determinants of the structure of trade change over
time can lead both to poor predictions and bad policy advice.
Given the increased interest in long—term shifts in trading
structures, it is argued that trade economists should enlarge
their analytical framework by endogenizing to a greater extent
the basic economic factors determining these shifts. They must
also recognize the endogenous nature of trade policies in their
models, if they are to carry out their predictive and evaluative
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I. Int'oduction
What determines the commodity pattern of trade between
count±es?Why does one country export textiles and another
export wine?This has long been the central question of trade
theory.
There seem to be two main reasons why economists are
interested in this question, other than a natural curiosity about
how economic matters are determined. First, they wish to predict
how a country's pattern of trade will change over time in order
to givemembersof the economy the opportunity to take steps to
better accommodate to the future. In carrying out this
objective, simply collecting evidence on how trade patterns have
actually changed over time is not sufficient for extrapolative
purposes unless these patterns can be divided into a definite
prcçession of stages.But the "stages" approach has proved to
be a notoriously poor predictor of future economic conditions.
Consequently, economists try to discover what underlying economic
vri.ables may have changed and "caused" changes in variables o
interest, such as the structure of trade. Using this
nfcrmat1on, they develop models that relate changes in basic
economic variables to changes in the structure of trade.2
Even if economists are able to predict a country's trade
pattern, given a particular set of underlying structural
variables,this is insufficient for predicting changes in the
pattern of trade over time. One must also be able to predict the
behavior of the underlying causal variables. In other words, one
must have a dynamic theory that explains how the underlying
structural causes of trade behave over time and thus how the
pattern of trade changes. Unfortunately, a long-standing
criticism of international economics has been that, while trade
economists have been reasonably successful in explaining trade
patterns at a particular point in time given knowledge of the
"causal" structural factors, they have done a poor job of
explaining how these structural factors themselves change over
time and thereby affect the pattern of international trade.
A second reason for the interest of international economists
in the determinants of trade is to be able to advise governments
how they can influence the economic welfare of particular groups,
the nation, or the world as a whole through policy measures that
affect trading patterns. What trade measures should be adopted,
for example, to raise the income of labor or increase the welfare
of the nation as a whole? Thus, trade economists are interested
in trade patterns and structural change for normative as well as
positive purposes.Satisfactory fulfillment of this normative
objective also requires an understanding of how particular
policies affect the basic determinants of trade patterns.For
example, it may be possible in the short run to increase the3
income received by labor by imposing a tax on imports. By
adversely affecting the income flow to capitalists, however, this
action may also lower the rate of capital accumulation and
thereby reduce labor's long—run income.
This paper focuses on economists' understanding of the basic
determinants of trade patterns and, in particular, the manner in
which these underlying factors change over time and are affected
by various policy measures.A brief survey will be presented
covering what economists have said about the determInants of the
commodity composition of trade and how well their theories have
been supported by empirical evidence. Fortunately, Ronald
Findlay (1984) has recently written an excellent comprehensive
survey of growth and development in trade models that carefully
compares the diverse analyses dealing with structural change and
international trade.
II. The Ricardian Model
As a prelude to discussing modern trade theory, it is useful
to consider the relations between trade and structural change in
the model that first set forth in a rigorous manner the basis and
benefits of international trade, namely, the model developed by
Ricardo in The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation
(1817). While Ricardo is best-known for his static theory of
comparative costs, his main writings centered on showing how
relative prices and the distribution of income changed as the
process of economic development occurred in a country. Moreover,4
although Ricardo did not do so explicitly, it is quite easy to
integrate his static trade theory and his development theory to
obtain a dynamic model of structural change and international
trade.
The key initiator of growth in the Ricardian model is the
capitalist class who, rather than consume most of their income
(profits), invest these funds to hire additional labor and
thereby expand production. (Landowners and workers, the other
two productive factors, consume all of their income.) While this
action bids up the wage rate for a given size labor force,it
also has the effect of increasing the supply of labor as the wage
rises above its "natural" level and death rates are reduced.
Increasing the use of labor in the manufacturing sector always
increases output in the same proportion, but the application of
labor to agricultural production is subject to diminishing
marginal productivity because of the fixed supply of high-quality
land. Consequently, as capital accumulation takes place (mainly
in the form of a larger wages fund), the prices of agricultural
products rise relative to manufactured goods (the labor theory of
value) and competition for better—quality lands causes an
increasing proportion of the output of a given amount of labor
employed on high-quality land to be transferred to the landowner
in the form of rent. In the agricultural sector, not only is the
increased relative value of the output of a given amount of labor
on high—quality land absorbed entirely by the landlord but, as in
the manufacturing sector, the increased relative cost of5
subsistence wages squeezes the profit rate earned by capitalists.
Consequently, capital accumulation and population growth tend to
decline untilastationary state is reached.
Comparative differences among countries in the labor
required to produce agricultural and manufactured goods based on
differences in land/labor ratios or in technological knowledge
serve as the basis for trade at any point in time. For England,
as Ricardo realized, the comparative—cost situation favored
exports of manufactured goods and imports of agricultural
products. This meant that the stationary state could be
postponed by obtaining cheaper food than could be produced at
home,thereby raising profit rates. Protection of the
agricultural sector (or any other tax that falls directly or
indirectly on profits)merely slows growth by raising
agricultural prices and relative wages and cutting into profits.
Ricardo and other classical writers also recognize in their
chapters, "On Color:ies," that international capital flows aimed
at providing infrastructure investment in transport facilities in
land—abundant countries can bring about even lower agricultural
prices.
The process of structural change for a country like England
is, for Ricardo, one of capital accumulation and population
growth accompanied by a relative increase in manufacturing
production ad an increase in the proportion of the country's
agricultural needs being met by imports. Ricardo was, however,
unable to convince himself that this process could continue6
indefinitelyand thus he predicted that the stationary state was
inevitable at some point in time.
The Ricardian model is useful to review not because of the
accuracy of its static and dynamic predictions about trade
patterns but because it is an illustration of a complete model of
structural change and trade patterns that explains why and how
the structural factors change over time and how these changes
affect the pattern of trade.Indeed, while the results of
predicting trade patterns on the basis of relative labor
producti.vitles support Ricardo's static trade theory (though, as
Deardorff (1984) points out, they can also be expected in the
Heckscher—Ohlin model), Ricardo's long—run predictions have
proved so contrary to casual historical observation that they are
discussed mainly for their importance in the development of
economic thought.
III.TheHeckscher-Ohlin Model
The core of modern trade theory is the Heckscher—Ohlin
model, a framework that relates intercountry differences in
comparative costs to differences in relative factor endowments.
The basic theorem states that countries tend to export those
good3 that use relatively intensively their relatively abundant
factors.
Although there has been recent discussion of the extent to
which the many empirical analyses of trading patterns in the
Heckscher—Ohlin framework constitute rigorous tests of the pure7
model, there seems to be an abundance of empirical support for
the importance of relative factor endowments in explaining the
commodity structure of trade. The recent study by Learner (1984),
in which he regressed the net exports of each of 10 aggrege
commodities for 60 countries on measures of the relative supplies
of 11 factors. of production for these countries, is the most
comprehensive analysis of this relationship. On the basis of his
painstaking measurement efforts and careful econometric analysis,
Learner concludes that "the main currents of international trade
are well understood in terms of the abundance of a remarkably
limited list of resources" and that1 in this sense, "the
Heckscher—Ohlin theory comes out looking rather well" (Learner,
1984, P. xvi).
Ifrelative factor endowments are a reasonably good
explanatory variable for the intercountry commodity structure of
trade at any point in time, an understanding of how factor
supplies change over time should provide an adequate explanation
of how this trade structure changes over time.Modern trade
economists have generally not pursued the issue of the causes of
changes in factor endowments, however.In their comparative
static and dynamic analyses they assume the existence of
intercountry differences in such endowment—related variables as
savings propensities, growth rates of population, and rates of
foreign investment and then trace the effects of these
differences on trade and growth patterns.
Like economists in other specialized fields of economics,8
trade economIsts have tended to leave the study of changes in
factor endowments to growth and development economists,
presumably because they believe changes in factor endowments are
more directly related to changes in income than to shifts in
trade patterns. Unfortunately, neither economists who have
analyzed the growth process in advanced countries nor those who
have been interested in explaining the development process in the
poorer nations have been particularly successful in explaining
changes in factor endowments.While they have discovered that
changes in endowment—related variables such as relative
expenditures on education and a country's propensity to save are
related to levels of income (see, for example, Chenery and
Syrquin, 1975),development economists have yet to understand
very well the complex interactions between income growth and
increases in factor supplies.Just as international economists
have been quite successful in accounting for those factors that
affect intercountry differences in trade patterns, growth and
development economists have been quite successful in accounting
for the sources of growth. But, like trade economists, they have
not been successful In ascertaining how the determinants of the
relationship in which they are interested change over time.
Withonlya crude understanding of the factors that affect
how relative factor endowments shift over time, trade ecoriomist
utilizing the Heckscher—Ohlin model are limited mainly to
investigating the effects of autonomous changes in factor
endowments on trading patterns.Fortunately, this has still9
proved to be a useful activity, both because observed trends in
factor endowment changes usually continue for some period of time
and because shifts in trade patterns seem to respond slowly to
these endowment changes.But one is restricted to relatively
short—run predictions and even these can be far off the mark when
there are significant changes in factor conditions.
One important question that has been investigated using
computable general equilibrium models based on the Heckscher—
Oh].in framework of fixed factor endowments is the effect of
existing tariffs and nontariff trade barriers on the structure of
trade and world welfare. Deardorff and Stern (1983), for
example, estimate that the elimination of all tariffs in the
industrialized countries would increase exports by $29 billion or
by about 3.9% and raise world welfare by $619 million or 1/100 of
one percent.Whalley (1985) places the gain in world welfare
resulting from the abolition of all forms of protection by the
developed countries at $28 billion or about 4/10 of one percent
of world income.(He does not present figures on the estimated
change in the volume of trade.
While the large absolute magnitude of these estimated trade
and welfare changes suggest that efforts by governments to obtain
these gains are very worthwhile in benefit/cost terms, the small
percentage changes in welfare seem to indicate that existing
distortionary trade policies do not have a significant adverse
effect on world real income.This conclusion contrasts sharply
with the historical experience of both developing and developed10
countries in the last 40 years. There is an abundance of
evidence, especially for the developing countries, indicating
that countries that have pursued liberal trade and exchange—rate
policies have grown significantly faster than those that have
favored restrictive, inward—looking trade and exchange—rate
measures. The failure of existing trade models to capture these
real world effects of trade policies appears to be due to failure
of these models to take account of how trade policies affect
changes in factor endowments and other basic determinants of
growth rates.
Without an adequate understanding of the feedback of
policy—induced, short—run changes in the structure of trade on
the underlying determinants of this structure, economists are in
danger of recommending policies that reduce a country's economic
welfare in the long run.There is considerable evidence, for
example, that most trade economists' recommendation to developing
countries after World War II to impose import protection to
stimulate the development of domestic manufacturing proved to be
counter—productive because of the adverse long—run consequences
of import substitution on basic factor conditions.
Whilethelack of understanding of traditional economic
relationships between public policies and factor endowments is a
likely cause of the bad advice economists have sometimes offered,
so too is a lack of understanding of the political processes by
which public decisions are reached in democracies.Too often
economists assume that public officials are able to promote the11
same national welfare goals in which economists are interested
rather than recognizing thatthese officialsare often
constrained by the self—interests of various pressure groups upon
whom they must rely for political support.
IV. Technology, Imperfect Competition, and Increasing Returns_
Although the Heckscher-Ohlin model performs reasonably well
in explaining commodity trading patterns, the restrictiveness of
some of its assumptions suggests that the introduction of other
variables besides relative factor endowments could improve its
empirical performance.For example, the assumption of identical
production functions among countries for all industries is
difficult to accept in view of the observed unevenness in the
sources of technological change coupled with the lack of perfect
international movement of technological knowledge due to the
patent system and other barriers to knowledge transfer. Casual
observation suggests that the unique technological knowledge
possessed by some countries is the source of their comparative
advantage in certain industries.Similarly, the assumptions of
perfect competition and constant returns to scale have also long
made trade economists uneasy about the Heckscher—Ohlin model,
since again casual observation seems to suggest an explanatory
role for imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale.
For example, instead of the volume of trade decreasing as the
endowments of the industrial countries became more similar, as
the Heckscher—Ohlin theory predicts, trade among these countries- 12
has increased in relative importance, especially for
differentiated manufactured products.
Posner (1961) and Vernon (1966) are perhaps the best-known
modern economists who have stressed the importance of differences
in technological knowledge in accounting for the intercountry
commodity pattern of trade. Both emphasize that new technology
is constantly being created and older technology transferred
among countries, thus yielding at any point intime differences
among countries in production functions as a sourceof variations
in trading patterns. However, other than some discussion of the
influence of income—level--related differences in demand and
relative factor prices on the commodity composition of
technological progress (a relationship that could be combined
with the standard analysis of the effects of various factor—
saving forms of technological progress to develop a dynamic
theory of the behavior of a country's trading pattern), they do
not explain what determines i.ntercountry differences in the rate
and nature of technological progress.
The existence of a series of orderly steps in the transfer
of technology across countries (Vernon's product cycle) may
enable economists to predict the ultimate trade—pattern effects
of given technological changes, but the apparent jumps in th
traditional sequence of steps evident in the experience of some
of the newly industrialized countries suggest the need for
considerable caution in using a stages approach to predict the
trade consequences of known technological changes.And, oe13
course, the problem emphasized in discussing the Heckscher—Ohlin
model stillexists,namely,an inability toexplain
satisfactorily the causes and nature of technological progress in
the long term and the manner in which public measures aimed at
promoting technological change affect other basic determinants of
income and the structure of trade.
Undoubtedly, the most active area of trade theory at the
present time is the introduction of imperfect competition and
increasing returns to scale into trade models. Initially, modern
interest in imperfect competition arose because of the desire to
explain the growing volume of intraindustry trade, while interest
in increasing returns stemmed mainly from the belief that this
factor as well as intercountry differences in technology was a
needed modification to the Heckscher—Ohlin framework. However,
there is a growing be.ief by some trade theorists, such as
Helpman and Krugman (1985), that the explanatory power derived
from introducing imperfect competition and increasing returns
ranks in importance with relative factor endowments, especially
for trade in manufactured goods. This new approach offers rich,
as yet unexploited, opportunities for important empirical
research.
In some ways trade models with imperfect competition are
even more deficient in their dynamic implications than the
Heckscher-Ohlin model.In models where differentiated products
are introduced, for example, thequestion of which country
produces a particular variety of a product is indeterminats.14
Consequently, this particular feature of the commodity structure
of trade is not explained in either a static or dynamic framework
nor is attention given to how the set of possible product
varieties changes over time. In oligopolistic models with
homogeneous products and identical tastes across countries, the
direction of trade no longer depends only on the conventional
supply—oriented determinants of comparative advantage but also on
such factors as the relative market sizes of the countries and
the number of firms producing each product.However, these
variables are generally not, in turn, made endogenous in a
broader theory explaining the behavior of trading patterns over
time. Consequently, as trade economists improve upon their
explanations of the determinants of the structure of trade at any
point in time, the inadequacy of trade theory from a general
dynamic perspective becomes more apparent.
V. The Need for a Broader Framework for International Economics
As the preceding brief survey of trade theories and tests of
these theories indicates, modern international economics is quite
weak in explaining how the structure of trade changes over time.
The basic determinants of the nature of this structure at any
point in time have been identified reasonably well, but the
manner in which these basic factors behave over time has not
received much attention by trade theorists. Typically,
comparative static or dynamic analyses assume an exogenous change
in an underlying factor such as the capital stock, technology, or15
consumer preferences and then trace the effects of this change on
the pattern of trade and other variables of interest, such as
factor returns.
This procedure can lead both to poor predictions and bad
policy advice.If, for example, an increase in the physical
stock of capital has effects on trade patterns and income which
in turn affect the magnitude of the capital stock (either by
their effects on savings and Investment or on the propensity to
save) and other basic determinants of the structure of trade, the
usual analytical approach is inappropriate for predicting the
behavior of the structure of trade. Furthermore, post—World War
II economic history strongly supports the view that the nature of
the policies adopted for the purpose of increasing basic factor
endowments has significant effects on the rate of economic
development. Since economists generally do not include such
effects in their models, the advice they provide about how factor
supplies can best be increased may be poor. Of course, it can be
argued that feedback effects can be ignored for short-term
predictions.But, as we have learned from modern macroeconomic
analysis, expectations about the future are likely to influence
the current behavior of economic agents so that to ignore these
feedbacks also leads to an improper analysis of short—run
effects.
In view of the difficult structural problems faced by the
industrialized countries of Europe and North America coupled with
the rapidly changing trade patterns of Japan and many developing16
countries, trade economists are being called upon to an
increasing extent to predict the long—run implications of these
conditions on the trading structure of individual countries and
the world as a whole. Trade economists pride themselves on
analyzing issues within a general equilibrium framework.
Moreover, they have done much in recent years to counter the
criticism that trade theory is too static.But to respond to
some of the most politically important issues of the present
time, they must enlarge their dynamic general equilibrium
framework by endogeni.z!ng to a greater extent the basic economic
factors that determine the structure of trade.
To meet this challenge, more trade economists must undertake
research on subjects traditionally studied mainly by growth and
development economists and economic historians and by scholars in
other disciplines. While there is a group of trade/development
economists who have moved somewhat in this direction, it is much
too small to deal adequately with the important issues at hand.
More specifically, we must try to understand better the
determinants of the rate of accumulation of both physical and
human capital, the rate of population growth, the rate of
utilization of natural resources, the extent of entrepreneurial
vigor, the structure of markets, taste changes, and the rate,
nature, and diffusion of technological knowledge. These are
enormously complex relationships and progress made over the last
40 years in understandingthem has been disappointing. But
greaterconsideratIon of these matters is necessary if the17
analysisof trade economists is to be useful for dealing with the
major trade issues of the tImes.
Economists (international and otherwise) alsoneedto devote
more attention to the political economy aspects of their areas of
specialization.The key idea in the political economy field is
that public policies are endogenous rather than exogenous
variables.There are both good positive and normative reasons
for widening the framework of analysis to recognize that measures
such as tariffs or quotas are the outcome of a balance of
lobbying activities between those who benefit from such measures
and those who lose. For example, predictions of what will happen
to particular economic variables when actions by public officials
are involved are likely to be incorrect without an understanding
of the political and economic pressures under which public policy
decisions are made.
The Multi—Fiber Arrangement provides a good illustration of
how the actual economic outcome of a policy action can differ
widely from what the traditional model might lead economists to
expect. The argument fcr protection of the textiles industry in
the early 1960s was that the industry needed "some breathing
space't for a short period so it could secure sufficient profits
to purchase modern capital equipment to make the industry
internationally competitive again. Yet we have seen that public
officials in the industrialized countries have been subject to
such strong political pressures from workers and management in
the industry that they have been required to continue protection18
at increasingly restrictive levels. Those who thought protection
could be imposed only temporarily were proved to be very wrong in
their predictions.Modern political economy analysis suggests
that what actually happened should not have been unexpected and
might have been avoided if assistance to the industry had been
rendered in a different form.
The normative grounds for viewing public policy matters in
political economy terms are equally important.Lobbying for
public measures such as tariffs that increase the profits of
domestic firms is perfectly consistent with the rational behavior
that economists assume firms follow in seeking to increase their
profits through the production of goods and services.
Furthermore, lobbying activities involve costs, as does the
production of goods. Consequently, in assessing the welfare
effects of a particular public policy, economists should take
into account the value of the real resources expended in the
lobbying activities associated with the introduction and
continuation of the policy. As Bhagwati (1980) has demonstrated,
national welfare may be either greater or less when the resources
used in implementing a welfare—distorting public measure are
taken into consideration. But the main point economists should
recognize is that particular public policies are introduced and
maintained as the result of a complex lobbying process and that
they must include these activities in their analytical framework
in order tocarryout their predictive and evaluative roles
in the best possible manner.19
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